Ensuring Real Dominance Over Corridors and Developing and Implementing an Appropriate Strategy Based on Profound Awareness of the Real Pan-Turkist Threat

By Alec Yenikomshian

(Part 1 of a five-part series)

As expected, the agreement reached between Pashinyan and Aliyev on August 8 in Washington D.C. "witnessed" by Trump, and the initialing of the "Peace Treaty" between foreign ministers, once again opened the door to heated debates, objective and non-objective assessments, mutual criticisms, and accusations. This is natural. It could not have been otherwise, especially regarding the decisive issue of communication corridors.

The details of the "Trump Route" have not yet been published. The authorities insist that they have not yet been finalized, but that in all cases Armenia's sovereignty and territorial integrity will be guaranteed. But what is already known (the "unimpeded" clause and its unilaterality, as well as other points) is sufficient to conclude with considerable confidence that Azerbaijan has received, if not already complete, at least already a "half-passage." Nevertheless, it seems undeniable that with this agreement Armenia gains a certain amount of time.

The question of the real content of the "route" is undoubtedly extremely important and fateful. But the more important question is: what happens next?

The authorities and their supporters are in euphoria or pretend to be so: peace has already been achieved, and Armenia has secured the backing of the US. And a decision has already been announced to effectively reduce the proportion of the defense budget. These are criminal delusions at best. The "official" opposition, beyond its usual sloganeering accusations, says and does little of substance, while most more respectable opposition voices are also content with analytical criticism and seemingly do not consider with necessary seriousness the problem of what to do next.

As in the past 35 years, so too today, the starting point for answering the question of what to do must have been and must be the deep understanding of the most essential fact characterizing Armenia's reality and reaching the conclusions that follow from it. That most essential fact is the existence of the pan-Turkist program. That program exists and it is absolutely not conditioned by Armenia's positions toward Turkey and Azerbaijan. The development of serious discussions around all issues and the search for solutions must necessarily take place within the framework of awareness of the conditions imposed by that most essential fact.

Starting from 1990-91, the discussions that have unfolded in Armenia around the most serious agendas and issues and the decisions that have been made have almost always not been based on the acknowledgment of that fact, and for that reason have been, from the beginning, one could say, disconnected from reality. This deserves to be addressed in a separate article.

But even after those fateful omissions, at least today it is necessary to emerge from the ostrich policy and try to find the answer to the question of what to do based on the awareness of the mentioned fact. And the main conclusion stemming from that awareness is that pan-Turkism is a long-term program, it did not stop in the past, and Armenia, to survive, has no choice other than to acquire resiliency against it.

The conviction that Armenia has no strategic allies and cannot rely on the security guarantees of great powers is correct. The continuation of this assertion, according to which Armenia must therefore find the means and opportunity to live between Turkey and Azerbaijan without placing hope on external guarantors of an alliance scale, is also correct. But it is a grave delusion to think that Armenia does not have that opportunity due to "appearing with red rags" between two "bulls," and that it is sufficient to throw off those "rags" for Turkey and Azerbaijan to find themselves benevolent toward it. No agreement on "peace" and "normalization" of relations with the latter will remove the threat of pan-Turkism hanging over Armenia's head, as long as it has not acquired resiliency against it.

Some may object, saying that this reminder of the danger hanging in the air is not new and many are aware of it. True, especially after 2020, a significant portion of Armenian society is not ignorant of this truth. But strategic decisions in Armenia and analyses have not been and continue not to be based on deep awareness of this truth, and for that reason it is necessary to explain and analyze it in detail once again. But to keep this article short and not to distort the core of what needs to be said here, this will be addressed separately.

Before that, however, it is necessary to make two important assertions, the first of which will be a repetition: 1. Pan-Turkist policy has not been conditioned in the past and is not conditioned today by Armenian real or supposed claims toward Turkey and Azerbaijan or by "adventurist" policy, but is a phenomenon driven by its own internal logic. 2. Independent of pan-Turkism, there are other geopolitical interests present in our region, and in the process of its implementation, pan-Turkism certainly cannot ignore that fact; but that changes nothing about the essence of the problem. The Turks (in the broad sense) strive to implement their strategy sometimes by exploiting the existence of those interests and the contradictions between them, sometimes by fighting against them. The pan-Turkist program continues to exist under the conditions of those interests and independent of those interests.

What does acquiring resiliency against pan-Turkism mean? It means (and meant) developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy based on the awareness of that fact—in all areas of state activity without exception: internal, defense and security, external, economic, social, scientific-educational, relations with the diaspora and involving it in that strategy, and other spheres. The development and implementation of strategy in all these areas is of course the function of any state. And here the emphasis is on the imperative that this strategy must necessarily be "based on the fact of pan-Turkism's existence."

That strategic program had much greater possibilities for success before 2020. After losing thirty years of time, after heavy defeat and the loss of Artsakh, in the current conditions of Azerbaijan's continuing demands and threats, the first prerequisite for acquiring possible resiliency is ensuring Armenia's real dominance over the corridors in Meghri and generally in Syunik. Only in that case can the short-term, medium-term, and long-term comprehensive strategic program of resiliency have a possibility of success.

It is extremely important to realize that after our defeat and the loss of Artsakh, in the current conditions of the balance of forces, Azerbaijan and Turkey have already no urgent need to resort to military operations to achieve their goals regarding Armenia within the pan-Turkist program. If they succeed in depriving Armenia of real dominance over the corridors, the achievement of their other goals, through continued threats and pressures, will simply become a matter of time, and Armenia will virtually disappear. After depriving it of that dominance, it will be much easier for them to impose the demands of "Western Azerbaijanis," demilitarization, $150 billion in "reparations," and other demands. Armenia simply has no alternative other than not allowing the loss of its dominance over the corridors and then acquiring the other conditions of resistance capacity.

It is long past time for political forces and groups with honest motives, political-social figures, analysts, citizens and compatriots not to be satisfied with criticism and analysis of the situation, but to conduct political activity and struggle based on clear programs for the sake of solving the problem of what to do.

The boundaries of our possibilities have narrowed extremely. But we have no alternative. Either we will make that attempt, and perhaps we will be saved, or we will disappear.

SUMMARY

• As in the past thirty-five years, today as well, the starting point for answering the question "what to do" should have been and must be the deep awareness of the most essential fact characterizing Armenia's reality — the existence of the pan-Turkic program — and the formulation of the consequences that flow from it.
• Pan-Turkic policy has not been conditioned in the past and is not conditioned today by real or supposed Armenian claims against Turkey and Azerbaijan or by "adventurist" policies, but is a phenomenon driven by its own internal logic.
• It is a grave error to think that Armenia cannot find means and possibilities to live between Turkey and Azerbaijan because it "appears with red clothes" in the arena of these two "bulls," and that it is enough for it to remove these "clothes" for Turkey and Azerbaijan to become benevolent toward it.
• Armenia, to survive, has no choice but to acquire resiliency against the pan-Turkish program.
• No "peace" agreement and "normalization" of relations will eliminate the threat of pan-Turkism hanging over Armenia if it has not acquired resiliency against it.
• Acquiring resiliency against pan-Turkism means developing and implementing, ON THE BASIS OF PROFOUND AWARENESS OF THIS FACT, a comprehensive strategic program in all areas without exception of state activity: internal, defensive and security, foreign, economic, social, scientific and educational, relations with the diaspora and its involvement in this strategy, and other fields.
• In the current conditions of continuing demands and threats from Azerbaijan (and Turkey), the first prerequisite for acquiring possible resiliency is ensuring Armenia's genuine sovereignty over the corridors of Meghri and Syunik in general.
• After our defeat and the loss of Artsakh, in the current conditions of the balance of forces, Azerbaijan and Turkey already do not have an urgent need to resort to military actions to achieve their goals. If they succeed in depriving Armenia of genuine sovereignty over the corridors, the achievement of their other objectives, through continuing threats and pressures, will simply become a matter of time, and Armenia will de facto disappear.
• The clause in the August 8 agreement guaranteeing Azerbaijan "unimpeded passage" is sufficient to conclude with adequate certainty that Azerbaijan has obtained at least a "half-corridor." But the "Trump Route" agreement has not yet been concluded, and Armenia must do EVERYTHING so that, beyond its formal registration, sovereignty is irrefutably consolidated in the agreement's provisions.
• Armenia simply has no alternative to not allowing the loss of its sovereignty over the corridors and acquiring the other conditions of resistance capacity through a comprehensive strategic program. The limits of our possibilities have become extremely narrow. But either we will make this final attempt and save ourselves, or we will disappear.

Top photo: Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meet in Istanbul on June 20, 2025 to discuss normalizing relations between their countries.

(Pt II: The clauses which should be firmly included in the final official TRIPP agreement for Armenia to keep its sovereignty over the “Trump Route.”)